Problem Solving 02

Beka Modebadze 2019 - https://github.com/bexxmodd/econ-papers-reproduction


Replication of a paper published by Sam Jones and Finn Tarp - "Does foreign aid harm political institutions?"

Original paper, published by Journal of Development Economics in 2015. You can download it from here


For the second problem solving I will replicate a paper that examines the effect of the financial aid on governmental institutions. Here is the abstract from the original paper:

The notion that foreign aid harms the institutions of recipient governments remains prevalent. We combine new disaggregated aid data and various metrics of political institutions to re-examine this relationship. Long run cross-section and alternative dynamic panel estimators show a small positive net effect of total aid on political institutions. Distinguishing between types of aid according to their frequency domain and stated objectives, we find that this aggregate net effect is driven primarily by the positive contribution of more stable inflows of ‘governance aid’. Weconclude that the data do not support the view that aid has had a systematic negative effect on political institutions

lets import the data and observe first and last five rows

I'll rename column 'recipient' to more familiar name: 'country'

Part 1:


1.a) First, we'll look at the number of observations for each country

We see that we have a total of 2843 observations from 106 countries but the number of observations (years) for each country varies

1.b) This paper uses five variables of interest (depended) to try and explain the effect of the financial aid on the institutions. These variables are indices that measure a variety of institutions.

This is the summary of the institutional variables:

Variables Source var. name Notes
Democracy Freedom House polity Captures the extent of democracy. Original data, taken directly from the QoG database, ranges from: 0 = “least democratic”; to 10 = “most democratic”. Following (Hadenius and Teorell, 2005) this variable is calculated as the average of the Freedom House polity measure (the mean of political rights and civil liberty indexes, fh_pr and fh_cl) and the Polity IV revised combined polity score (p_polity2), both converted to a 0–10 scale.
Checks DPI checks Reflects the number of veto players over political decisions, which is the number actors whose approval is necessary for a shift in policy. Original data ranges from 1 (lowest) to 18 (highest).
Executive constraints Polity IV xconst Captures the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief (political) executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Original data ranges from: 1 = “unlimited authority”; to 7=“executive parity or subordination”.
Political terror (–) WG10 ptss A reverse scale of political terror. Original data is collated from annual reports on human rights published by the U.S. State Department and ranges from: 1 =“countries under a secure rule of law”; to 5=“terror has expanded to the whole population”. This original scale is reversed for the present analysis.
Judicial independence CR10 injud Indicates the extent to which the judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as another branch of the government or the military. Original data ranges from: 0 = “not independent”; to 2=“generally independent”.

Part 2:


The main explanatory variable (independent) is aid which is overall aid, and its three components. We'll explore those variables

2.a) we start with summarizing three types of Aid and the GDP of recipient country:

Part 3:


Now let's test the theory

First, generate a new variable, 'inst' that is the average of the five institutional variables. Draw the histogram of your variable

3.a) We run first regressions with an average of institutional indices on aid and its components

First, we regress average score of indices on every type of financial aid individually and analyze the findings

Summary: We have an interesting finding displayed here. It shows that governmental financial aid is the only type of aid which helps to improve institutions in the recipient country. Its P-value is close to zero which speaks of its statistical significance. However, other types of financial aid (the economic aid, the other aid, and the total aid) have a negative effect on the institutions. All of those variables have a P-value close to zero which means they also are statistically significant. There’ve have been many critics of financial aid, which has not resulted in the improvement of institutional qualities in receiving countries. Usually, those funds are never put to expected employment and are consumed by the bank accounts of the small number of people. Of course, we cannot explain (and I never intended) the effect of the financial aid by one variable as there are other variables that we have not controlled for, but it gives some idea if those aids are working towards a positive direction or towards a negative direction.

3.a) Next we'll run the regression with all three types of Aid:

Part 4:


Institutional variables are slow-changing variables. Changes from one year to another may not be considerable. To overcome this issue, we can use the mean values of measured over time.

4.a) In this part we'll calculate the mean values of variables for each country

4.b) Now, we'll run a regression with the mean scores of those indices and compare the results

Part 5:


5.a) We will add the income variable 'recipientGdp_log' to the model, to control for income and explain if it's statistically significant to include and/or if it's a reasonable candidate to be in our model

we convert 'recipientGdp_log' to float type and fill NaN results with the mean values of the _GDPlog

We regress our model with the log value of the income, which represents percentage change in income:

5.b) Next, I will add some of the most interesting and statistically significant variables to the model which I picked from testing several combinations.

Many conclusions can be done based on these results. But the one thing is evidential that countries who have good institutional quality benefit from additional funds received from other countries targeted on the further improvement of those institutions. Also, government aid works best. Giving money to countries with natural resources like oil & gas has deteriorated their institutional quality. My findings are close to what original paper suggests, even though I've not gotten into using lagged values of aid variables, which authors of the paper consider to have better explanatory power as per fact after receiving aid it takes some time until we see the results of those funds.